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MATHEW FRASER SHEDS HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AT THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATES
Freedom of speech has been recognized as one of the preeminent rights of
individual liberty.' Justice Cardozo characterized it as "the matrix, the indis-
pensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."2 However, the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of speech does not confer an absolute right to
speak and the law has long recognized the possibility to abuse such freedom.'
Professor Thomas Emerson's emphasis on the importance as well as the
perplexity of arriving at an understanding of the definition of freedom of
speech is readily appreciated when attempting to gain an understanding of
such a complex area.' "The theory of freedom of expression is a sophisticated
and even complex one. It does not come naturally to the ordinary citizen but
needs to be learned. It must be restated and reiterated not only for each genera-
tion but for each new situation."5 The Constitution does not bestow an "un-
bridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language."6 The first
amendment is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness.7 Accordingly, the
state's power to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its
authority over adults, and the well-being of children is one subject entirely
within the state's constitutional power to regulate While children clearly have
some first amendment rights, these rights differ in important respects from the
rights enjoyed by adults.' As the Supreme Court noted, "the world of children
'Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 489 F.Supp. 763, 769 (N.D. Miss. 1980), rev'd, 701 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1983),
reh'g granted, 701 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1983), affd, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983).
2Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969).
'See O'NEIL, FREE SPEECH RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION UNDER LAW (1972). For a good discussion on the
historical background of free speech, see generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 830-35 (3rd ed. 1986); Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
'Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
'Id. at 894.
'Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927), overruled, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Lit-
tle can be gathered from the actual debates within the House concerning the meaning of the first amend-
ment. The Framers felt no need at the time to explain a provision expressly upholding a general theory of
freedom of speech. NOWAK, supra note 3, at 833.
'A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
'Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (Douglas, J. dissenting), reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968).
'Id. at 638. Although a great difference exists as to the court's treatment of adults and its treatment of
children, the authority the court possesses over adults can be better understood from Justice Harlan's ma-
jority opinion in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869
(1961):
Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitu-
tionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand,
certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of con-
stitutional protection .... On the other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the
content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type
of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have
been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality
which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interests involved ...
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is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The factor of immatur-
ity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different rules."'" At school, the
authorities stand in loco parentis to enforce minimum standards of
expression."
Despite the power of the state to regulate students' conduct, these types of
cases become particularly difficult to resolve inside the courtroom because
they usually involve two competing principles of constitutional structure. On
the one hand, the court has recognized the importance of the public schools in
the preparation of students as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on
which our society rests.12 Yet, on the other hand, it is beyond dispute that
school authorities must also act within the confines of the first amendment.
3
Despite the ongoing contradiction, courts can easily reconcile that first amend-
ment jurisprudence recognizes an avid interest in protecting minors from ex-
posure to vulgar and offensive language. Such protection has become a highly
appropriate function of public school education. 4 While there is a certain aura
of sacredness attached to the first amendment, constitutional rights must be
balanced against the state's obligation to educate students in an ordinary and
decent manner. 5
It comes as no surprise that today's high school students are not insulated
from the "shocking demonstrators and protestors in streets and on campuses
and by authors of best-selling modern literature.' 6 Yet, it is still considered
quite a different matter when students take on the same language within the
schoolhouse doors. 7 Justice Black once stated:
. . . if the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools,
"Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.
"New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
"Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
"Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 865 (1982). The school board was forbidden to rid the library of
books they considered vulgar and obscene, The court held that while students' first amendment rights must
be construed in light of the needs of the School Board, the special characteristics of the library make the
library especially appropriate for recognition of such rights. Id. at 871. The books ordered removed from the
library included: SLAUGHTER HOUSE FIVE by KURT VONNEGUT JR.; THE NAKED APE by DESMOND MORRIS:
DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS by PERI THOMAS; BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS, edited by
LANGSTON HUGHES; Go ASK ALICE, of anonymous authorship; A HERO AIN-r NOTHIN" BUT A SANDWICH by
ALICE CHILDRESS; and SOUL ON ICE by ELDRIDGE CLEAVER. Id. at 856 n.3.
'It is much more difficult to regulate an adult's exposure to vulgar and offensive language. However, the
majority in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), decided that obscenity is not an utterance within the
area of protected speech and press. See generally JUSTICE DOUGLAS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (H. Bosmajian
ed. 1980).
"Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F.Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
"Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, Board of Educ. v. Scoville, 400 U.S.
826 (1970); See generally Garvey, Children and The First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321 (1979).
"it is important at this time to note that this article concentrates on free speech of high school students.
Younger students as well as college students have considerably different standards to follow. For an ex-
cellent study on college students' rights see RATLIFF, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF COLLEGE STUDENTS
(1972); see generally Berham, Student in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America, 40
HARV. EDUC. REV. 567-595 (1970).
[Vol. 20:3
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kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools can defy and flout orders
of school officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the
beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country
fostered by the judiciary. 8
With respect to Justice Black's statement, the courts have continuously held
that school officials may curtail first amendment rights by reasonable regula-
tions necessary to maintain orderly conduct during school hours. Further-
more, school officials have the inherent authority to maintain order; thus they
have latitude and discretion to formulate rules, regulations and general stan-
dards of conduct. 20
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,2' the idea that the school has
a right to regulate students' speech continues."2
FACTS OF BETHEL
On April 26, 1983, Mathew Fraser, a student at Bethel High School in
Bethel, Washington, delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for a stu-
dent government position. 3 The following statements were included in his
speech:
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt,
his character is firm ... Jeff Kulhman is a man who takes his point and
pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He
doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and pushing un-
til finally - he succeeds ... Jeff is a man who will go to the very end -
even the climax for each and every one of you."'
Approximately 600 high school students, many of whom were fourteen year-
olds, attended the assembly."
Two of Fraser's teachers, with whom he had discussed the contents of the
speech, advised him not to deliver it because of its inappropriateness, and sug-
gested that his delivery might generate severe consequences.26
A school counselor who had observed the student reaction to the speech,
"Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 518 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
"Tate v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972). A reasonable regulation has been defined as one
which is "essential in maintaining order and discipline on school property" and "which measurably con-
tributes to the maintenance of order and decorum within the educational system." Id. at 978. The Tate court
held that the suspension of high school students under regulation, which in effect prohibited the creation of
disturbance in an assembly, did not violate students' first amendment free speech rights. Id. at 979.
"Tate, 453 F.2d at 978.
11106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
nId.
"Id. at 3162.
11Id at 3167.
"Id. at 3162.
2Id.
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noted that some students, "hooted" and "yelled," and some, with gestures,
graphically imitated the sexual activities alluded to in Fraser's speech." Other
students appeared bewildered and embarrassed by the speech.28 One teacher
reported that on the day after the speech it was necessary to forgo a portion of
the scheduled class to discuss the speech. 9
On the morning after his speech Fraser was informed that the school con-
sidered the speech to have violated a Bethel High School Disciplinary rule.30
Fraser also received copies of five letters by teachers describing his conduct at
the assembly." Fraser admitted he had given the described speech and that he
had deliberately used the sexual innuendoes contained in the speech.32 Fraser
received a three-day suspension and was permanently removed from the list of
candidates for graduation speaker.33
Through the school grievance procedures, Fraser sought review of the dis-
ciplinary sanction. 4 The hearing officer determined that because of the sexual
references the speech was "indecent, lewd, and offensive to the modesty of
many of the students and faculty in attendance."35 Thus, the officer upheld the
discipline.- After serving two days of his suspension, Fraser was permitted to
return to school.37 Fraser, under the guardianship of his father, decided to bring
a lawsuit against the school. 8
'7Id.
2id.
29Id.
"Id. The rule provides: "Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process
is prohibited, including the use of profane language or of gestures." Id. at 3162. The rule is modeled after the
test set out in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, which regulates the school's power to control students' actions.
"Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3162.
nId.
"Id. at 3162-63.
31Id. at 3163.
3Id. The usual test for determining whether language is "obscene" is found in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973). The Court in Miller defined "obscene" as:
(to] the average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the matter,
taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,
which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
Id. at 17. The court further set out basic guidelines for the trier of fact to follow. They were:
a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and
c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24. The Court in Bethel never had to determine the issue of whether or not Fraser's speech was
obscene. Whether this was because the obscenity of the speech was never doubted or whether the Miller test
is confined strictly to adults cannot be determined. However, it does seem that the process for determining
whether a student's speech is obscene is more a matter of school board discretion.
"'Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3163.
"Id. at 3163.
SId.
[Vol. 20:3
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 20 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol20/iss3/10
Fraser commenced an action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington. 9 He alleged a violation of his first amend-
ment right to freedom of speech and sought both injunctive relief and
monetary damages.10 The district court found in favor of Fraser for several
reasons." The court found that the school's sanctions violated Fraser's right to
free speech and that the school's rules were unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad.42 Furthermore, the removal of Fraser's name from the graduation
speakers' list violated the Due Process Clause since the disciplinary rules did
not specifically mention such removal as a possible sanction. 3 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court,
following basically the same rationale." The case was granted certiorari and
the Supreme Court reversed, and held in favor of the school. 5
SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
In its decision, the Court acknowledged the rooted concept that, "students
do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech of expression at the
schoolhouse gate," but at the same time distinguished the concept.4 Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District7 did not involve speech
or action that intruded upon the rights of other students. In Tinker, a number
of high school and junior high students were sent home from school for refus-
ing to remove armbands they wore to show objection to the Vietnam war. 8
Initially, the students were denied injunctive relief on the grounds that school
authorities acted reasonably in order to prevent disturbance. 9 The Supreme
Court, however, upheld the students' right to wear the armbands5 0 The Court
adopted the material disruption standard and resolved the case in favor of the
students since there was no material and substantial disruption.,,
On the contrary, Fraser's speech was the cause of much disruption." The
Court found that it was both lawful and desirable for school authorities to
39Id.
40 Id.
41Id.
'
2ld.
"Id.
44Id.
43 Id.
*Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503. See Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School 38 FORDHAM L.
REV. 35-62 (1969). See also Note, Constitutional Law: The Black Armbands Case - Freedom of Speech in
Public Schools, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 608 (1969).
"393 US. 503 (1969).
Old. at 503.
"Id.
3Id.
"Id. (The material disruption standard mentioned will be addressed at length at a further point in this note.)
"Fraser, 106 S.Ct. at 3159.
RECENT CASESWinter, 19871
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regulate the student's speech; such regulation was consistent with the fun-
damental values necessary to maintain a democratic political system, as well as
the principles underlying the role of the public educator.53 The Court balanced
the freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views within the school
against the public educator's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. 4
The Court looked at the most vigorous political debates of history,
especially the rules prohibiting the use of offensive expressions, and compared
them to Fraser's situation.15 The Court was quick to distinguish the level of
scrutiny applicable to students in a public high school.56 Nevertheless, the
Court found it a highly appropriate function of public education to prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse." To back this point,
the Court relied heavily on the idea that nothing in the Constitution prohibits
the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and
subject to sanctions. 8
The Court also stressed that the process of educating youth goes beyond
the books, the curriculum, and the classroom. 9 Teachers as well as older
students play an important role in demonstrating the appropriate form of civil
discourse. "They become, like parents, role models and their conduct and
deportment is studied in and out of class." 60 Furthermore, the Court concluded
that civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd,
531d.
-'For a general discussion of regulated speech and the value of free speech see generally M. REDISH,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984).
"The Manual of Parliamentary Procedure, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the House of
Representatives, governs the proceedings in that body and prohibits the use of expressions offensive to other
participants in a debate. Jefferson's manual is reprinted in MANUAL RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 97-271.
'Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
"Id. There is a great difference between the state's power to regulate an adult's speech in a public forum and
that of a student on school grounds. Accordingly, a different level of scrutiny is applied to each case.
In general, it may be said that the state may place reasonable time, place or manner restrictions on an
adult's speech that takes place in a public forum. City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n., 429 U.S. 167 (1976). To prevent the abuse of such power and to help assure that the regulations
are reasonable, the Court will determine if the regulation is a means of protecting important interests and
whether it is the proper means of protecting these interests. Id. at 167.
The court determines the validity of time, place, or manner restrictions in two slightly different ways.
First, the court will determine if the state is sufficiently justified within the Constitution to regulate the
speech. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), rehg denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968). Second, the court
uses a three-part test to determine the validity of the regulation. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
Regardless of which method the court chooses, it must be constitutionally justified in its actions.
Public schools must also be justified in limiting students' speech, but they are less restricted in their means
of imposing regulations. For the most part, the school only needs to prove that the student's speech had a
materially disruptive effect on the student body. (The "material disruptive" test will be discussed in detail
later on in this paper).
'Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
"11d. at 3165.
601d.
[Vol. 20:3
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indecent, or offensive speech.6'
EFFECT OF BETHEL
The Bethel decision is consistent with its precedents and faithfully con-
tinues to preserve the right of public school authorities to regulate students'
speech and expression.
In a similar case, Baker v. Downey City Board of Education,62 two
students were suspended from high school for the use of profanity and vulgari-
ty in a newspaper they published and distributed to other students. 3 The
district court distinguished the Tinker case on the basis that profanity and
vulgarity were not involved." In Baker, the boys were disciplined for the pro-
fane and vulgar manner in which they expressed their views.65 The court ruled
that: "the right to criticize and to dissent is protected to high school students
but they may be more strictly curtailed in the mode of their expression and in
other manners of conduct than college students or adults. The education pro-
cess must be protected and education programs properly administered."6
The Material and Substantial Disruption Requirement
To determine whether the student's conduct warrants punishment, courts
look to the standard in Burnside v. Byars.67 In that case, a regulation that pro-
hibited students from wearing "freedom buttons" was challenged.6 The
students purportedly wore the buttons to encourage members of the communi-
ty to exercise their civil rights.69 School officials saw no relation between the
wearing of buttons and the process of education, and further felt that such an
activity disrupted the school.70
When asked to remove the buttons, the students refused and as a result
were suspended.7' The lower court refused to enjoin the enforcement of the
regulation and the case came before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.72 The
"The issue concerning the removal of Fraser's name from the ballot for graduation speaker became moot
since Fraser had been permitted to speak in accordance with the District Court's injunction. Fraser, 106
S.Ct. at 3161.
62307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Calif. 1969).
"Id. at 517.
6Id.
651d at 527.
"Id.
61363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir 1966). For a similar case decided the same day see also Blackwell v. Issaquena Coun-
ty Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
"Burnside, 363 F.2d at 744.
01d. at 746.
7'd.
"Id. at 747.
71Id at 746.
Winter, 19871 RECENT CASES
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appellate court reversed the lower court's decision and held that the regulation
was "arbitrary and unreasonable, and an unnecessary infringement on the
students' protected right of free expression.""
The court emphasized the importance of free speech, holding that persons
have the right to communicate concerns which they feel are vital to public in-
terest.7' That right is clearly protected against infringement by state officials."
The court held that "school officials cannot infringe on their students' right to
free and unrestricted expression ... where the exercise of such rights do not
materially and substantially interfere with the requirement of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school."7" The court further noted that it did
not desire to undermine the authority of the school, as it recognized the value
of authority in operating an educational institution.77 This standard has been
consistently followed since Burnside, and only in recent years have some
courts disregarded the standard.78
Nevertheless, the material disruption standard has been the subject of
much debate among school officials and the courts. Questions arise as to what
constitutes a substantial disruption and what role the schools as well as the
courts play in the decision process. Generally, the standard remains flexible
and should be viewed in light of the delicate environment necessary to sustain
learning.
Although the courts have given schools enough discretion to insure that
students will be protected from indecent language and other student miscon-
duct, the material disruption standard remains inside the school house gates.
Indecent Language Outside the Classroom
Several decisions have addressed themselves to issues concerning indecent
language in situations involving children outside the classroom. In FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation,79 a radio station made an afternoon broadcast of come-
dian, George Carlin's, satiric monologue, "Filthy Words," which listed and
repeated words forbidden from public airwaves.8" A father who heard the
broadcast while driving with his young son complained to the FCC.8' The
court found that certain words in the monologue depicted sexual and excretory
activities in a particularly offensive manner, and since the show was broadcast
711d. at 748.
"Id. at 747.
75 Id.
71d. at 749.
7Id.
'Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
79438 U.S. 72 (1978), rehg denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
OId. at 726.
11id. at 730.
[Vol. 20:3
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in the early afternoon when children could easily be in the audience, the court
concluded the show was indecent and therefore prohibited. 2
Similarly, books, magazines and television shows are all forbidden from
making indecent material available to children. 3 Several decisions have ad-
dressed issues concerning other forms of freedom of expression. These cases
range from a school's successful attempt at suppressing the distribution of writ-
ten materials critical of the school,"4 to students' refusal to engage in patriotic
exercise, 5 to the most recent battle of students' rights to engage in school
prayer. 6
The Court continues to abide by the long-standing holding that obscenity
is not within the area of protected speech and that the scope of constitutional
freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or see material concerned
with sex depends on whether that citizen is an adult or minor.
A Move Away from the Traditional Standard
In a recent case, Williams v. Spencer,7 involving the ban of an unofficial
student newspaper, the court did not attempt to reconcile the Tinker
standard.8 Instead, the Williams court held that the Supreme Court did not in-
tend the substantial disruption requirement to be the only permissible justifica-
tion for curtailment of student speech. 9 The court held that another permissi-
ble justification was avoiding the encouragment of actions endangering the
health and safety of students. 9 In the same context, school authorities may, by
appropriate regulation, exercise restraint where they can reasonably forecast
substantial disruption of, or material interference with, school activities. 91 If a
'Id. at 726. The Court in this case upheld the power to regulate "adult speech" over radio air waves as well.
The Court held that the FCC does have the power to regulate a radio broadcast that is "indecent" but not
"obscene" in the constitutional sense. Id. at 731. The Court held that the FCC was warranted in concluding
that the words "obscene," "indecent," or "profane" are in the disjunctive, implying that each has a separate
meaning. Id. at 733. Prurient appeal is an element of "indecent," which merely refers to nonconformance
with accepted standards of morality. Id. at 739.
Protection of children is not the only reason why such regulations are placed on broadcasting. Such
regulations exist because adult viewers and listeners have the right to hear and view what they choose. For a
general overview of broadcasting rights see generally, J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA (1973); Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARv. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right ofAccess to the Media? 37
G.W.L. REV. 487 (1969).
s
3 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629, and Roth, 354 U.S. at 476, for a more in-depth discussion of prohibited
reading materials.
T Scoville, 425 F.2d at 10.
"Frain v. Baron, 307 F.Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
'Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). (These current topics have been researched extensively.
However, in order to limit the discussion to freedom of speech, references to these areas has been limited.)
p622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980).
831d.
19Id.
"Id.
"Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1971).
Winter, 1987] RECENT CASES
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reasonable basis for such a forecast exists, it is not necessary that the school
stay its hand in exercising a power of prior restraint until disruption actually
occurs.
92
A number of schools concerned with the alarming rise in school discipline
problems have gone even further. In these instances, high school students may
be punished for gross disobedience of school rules and gross disrespect of
school authorities, without a determination of the constitutionality of the rule
or the action of the school official.93 In other words, these schools need
demonstrate only gross disrespect in order to punish students. To some extent
the Bethel decision disregarded the due process argument and held that main-
taining security and order in school requires a certain degree of flexibility in
school disciplinary procedures.94
It is highly unlikely that the traditional standard of a material and
substantial disruption will be totally abandoned in the near future. The
Supreme Court has continued to require a material and substantial disruption
before allowing a school to restrict a student's freedom of speech. To allow the
schools to control student speech for any reason could easily facilitate the
schools gaining too much power and discretion to regulate student speech.
CONCLUSION
Courts have come a long way since the pre-Tinker days.95 Absent any proof
of substantial disruption, the courts remain only mildly opposed to allowing
school officials to set their own rules and regulations. The balance between the
public schools preparing students to be law-abiding citizens and the preserva-
tion of our societal values continues to remain stable and the courts' concern
for the future of this country's children remains indomitable.
The Bethel decision remains generally conservative, however, it is expan-
sive in the power it grants to regulate student speech. The school had little dif-
ficulty in establishing a "material" disruption. In other words, the materiality
requirement was easily met. In Tinker, the wearing of armbands did not satisfy
the material element. 96 From these examples, it is reasonable to conclude that
present courts are more willing than earlier courts to grant schools more discre-
'11d. at 730.
"Schwartz, 298 F.Supp. at 240 (student suspended for distributing high school newspapers referring to prin-
cipal as "King Louis," a "big liar," and "a person having racist views and attitudes."); Hatter v. Los Angeles
City High School Dist., 310 F.Supp. 1309 (D.C. Cal. 1970), rev'd 452 F.2d 673 (1971) (students suspended
for passing out leaflets opposed to a fund raising event without the school's permission and continuing to
wear tags bearing slogans that opposed fund raiser); Graham v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 335 F.Supp.
1164 (S.D. Texas 1970) (students suspended for distributing unauthorized newspapers at school.)
"Fraser, 106 S.Ct. at 3159.
"For an in-depth discussion of Tinker see Porto, The Tinker Decision and Native Americans: The Case For
Expanding A Precedent, II J.L. & EDUC. 65 (1982). For a related view, compare Diamond, The First
Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1981).
"Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
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tion to determine what constitutes a material disruption.
Without leeway provided by the courts, the authority of school officials to
maintain and enforce standards of discipline would be undermined by students
claiming first amendment rights. School officials would be limited in their
power to discipline a student, like Fraser, who makes a crude and sexually sug-
gestive speech. First amendment freedoms would no longer coexist har-
moniously with institutional needs.
Schools perform a special function in our society. They are entrusted with
the difficult task of educating children and preparing them for full partic-
ipation in adult society. In addition to transmitting necessary information
and techniques of learning to the students, we expect schools to instill cit-
izenship, discipline, and acceptable morals. In short, we expect schools to
inculcate society's values and help children become fully adjusted adults. 97
A move away from the material disruption standard would create too
much tension between the courts and our schools. Presently, courts give great
deference to the judgment of teachers and administrators. If schools begin to
control student speech impulsively, disregarding the material disruption stan-
dard, it will force the courts to take a more active role to institute guidelines.
The deference given to school officials would disintegrate due to the need for
such guidelines.
It does not seem necessary at this time to change something that has
worked well for the past twenty years. The courts and the schools have worked
closely together to preserve order and a proper educational environment.
KARRIE M. KALAIL
"Fraser, 106 S.Ct. at 3159.
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